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he three essays in this issue focus on the
theme of home and at-homeness. In the
first essay, interior designer Jane Barry
tells the story of her California family
home. She describes family routines in the house
and her father‘ increasing inability to live comfortably at home during the last few years of his life.
Though he became steadily more disabled, he
would not move from the house or accept design
modifications to make his life there easier.
In the second essay, health sociologist Andrew
Moore and nursing researcher Bernie Carter consider the impact of life-saving assistive technology
(AT) that many children with complex health needs
depend on in their homes. In author interviews,
parents of these children explained how this equipment intrudes into the home yet is absolutely necessary if the child is to remain alive. Moore and
Carter offer no easy way to reconcile this tension
between technological essentials and lived qualities
of at-homeness, but their essay perceptively illustrates how properties of the material and technological environment can play both a supportive and undermining role in domestic wellbeing.
In the third essay, philosopher Janet Donohoe
overviews home and at-homeness. She draws
on the phenomenological ideas of Gaston
Bachelard, Martin Heidegger, and Maurice
Merleau-Ponty, but gives particular emphasis
to Edmund Husserl‘s concepts of homeworld
and alienworld. Husserl interpreted homeworld as the tacit, taken-for-granted sphere
of experiences and situations typically not
called into question. Though unique for each
person, the homeworld is always in some
mode of lived mutuality with the alienworld—a world of difference and otherness
but only brought forward to awareness because of the always already givenness of the

homeworld. In the last part of her essay, Donohoe
considers what these concepts might mean for considering the experience of ―displaced‖ peoples and
for answering the question of whether an alien place
can ever take on the normative identity of home
place.
One of phenomenology‘s major contributions
to contemporary thinking is recognition that human
beings and their worlds are existentially intertwined
and that an integral aspect of this interconnectedness is how particular physical, environmental, and
spatial qualities of a world make that world one way
rather than another. In referring to environmental
features like dwelling layout, technological devices,
landscapes, and geographical worlds, these essays
illustrate how materiality, spatiality, and environmental embodiment contribute to specific domestic
lifeworlds. Directly or indirectly, the essays suggest
how such understanding might facilitate more lifegrounded theories, designs, and policies.
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Below: One house in a 1938 booklet of American house plans.
In her essay beginning on p. 4, Jane Barry describes her father‘s living in this house for 65 years and the environmental
difficulties he faced in the last several months of his life there.
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The 16th annual meeting of the International Association for Environmental Philosophy will be
held at the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Rochester, New
York, November 3–5, 2012. This event follows the
annual meetings of the Society for Phenomenology
and Existential Philosophy (SPEP) and the Society for Phenomenology and the Human Sciences
(SPHS). www.environmentalphilosophy.org/2012cfp.html.

More Donors, 2012
We are grateful to readers who, since the winter issue, have contributed more than the base subscription for 2012.
John Baker
Louise Chawla
Susan Ingham
Karen Kho
Anne Niemiec
Phil Stafford
Heather Thoma & Paul Salanki

Tom Barrie
Robert Habiger
Sara Ishikawa
Patricia Locke
Hanalei Rozen
Ingrid Leman Stefanovic
Ray Weisenburger

The Nature Institute in upstate New York is sponsoring two Goethean-science seminars this summer:
―The World of Color and Light‖ (June 17–23,
2012); and ―Coming to our Senses‖ (July 8–14,
2012). The second seminar aims to explore how the
different senses facilitate different modes of seeing
and understanding. info@natureinstitute.org.

EAP Symposium at EDRA, Seattle
The 43rd annual meeting of the Environmental Design Research Association (EDRA) will be held
May 30–June 2, 2012, at the Renaissance Seattle
Hotel, Seattle. EAP is sponsoring a symposium,
―Challenges for Qualitative Methods and Approaches in Environment-Behavior Research: Ideology, Ethics, and Understanding Phenomena.‖
Presenters include Lynne C. Manzo, Associate Professor Department of Landscape Architecture, College of Built Environments, University of Washington, Seattle; Jeremy C. Wells, Assistant Professor,
Historic Preservation Program, School of Architecture, Art and Historic Preservation, Roger Williams
University, Bristol, Rhode Island; and EAP editor
David Seamon. www.edra.org/.

Citations Received
Christopher Klemek, 2011. The Transatlantic Collapse of Urban Renewal Postwar Urbanism from New York to Berlin. Chicago:
Univ. of Chicago Press.
From the introduction: ―The attempts to impose a new order
on cities, and specifically a modernist vision of urbanism, via
urban renewal policies eventually engendered a fierce backlash… that extended from North America to Western Europe.
Instead of such sweeping approaches to cities, writer Jane Jacobs joined a younger generation of New Left urbanists to
advocate a house-to-house approach, both for organizing
grassroots resistance, and for a gentler, graduate renewal of
cities…. Suddenly, the once vigorously contested boundary
that had characterized the urban policy favored by many liberal reformers, with its clear demarcations, became a vanishing
frontier, and gave way instead to a more complicated condition. Old political, conceptual, and even economic categories
fell apart; old battle lines disengaged…. The American urban
frontier was effectively abandoned by the 1970s, when President Richard Nixon took a declare-victory-and-retreat approach by dismantling all urban renewal programs.‖

Items of Interest
The 4th annual meeting of the Interdisciplinary
Coalition of North American Phenomenologists
will be held May 25–27, 2012, at New York City‘s
Fordham University. The theme of the conference is
―Interdisciplinarity beyond the Academy: Lived
Worlds of Consequence for Academic Work.‖
www.icnap.org/; jmartinez@asu.edu.

Jeff Malpas, 2012. Heidegger and the Thinking of Place: Explorations in the Topology
of Being. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Aesthetics and Ethics of Architecture and the
Environment is a conference to be held July 11–13,
2012, at Newcastle University, Newcastle upon
Tyne, United Kingdom. The conference aim is to
broaden aesthetic discourse ―beyond questions relating to purely visual phenomena to include those
derived from all facets of human experience.‖

Expanding arguments in his earlier Heidegger‘s Topology, this
philosopher examines the place aspects of Heidegger‘s
thought. Malpas suggests that ―philosophy begins in wonder
and beings in place and the experience of place. The place of
wonder, of philosophy, of questioning is the very topos of
thinking.‖

http://ispaconference.wordpress.com/
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Linda Finlay, 2011. Phenomenology for
Therapists: Researching the Lived World.
Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.
Though this psychotherapist directs her discussion
to therapists, her presentation of the nature of phenomenology and phenomenological methods provides a lucid introduction for anyone interested
phenomenology. The first part of the book provides
an accessible overview of phenomenology broadly
and then highlights specific aspects of the ―phenomenological project,‖ which Finlay explicates in
terms of six central themes:
1. A focus on lived experience and meanings;
2. The use of robust, thorough descriptions of experiences, situations, and events as lived;
3. A concern with existential issues;
4. The intertwinement of people and world;
5. The use of the ―phenomenological attitude,‖
which includes bracketing and reflexivity;
6. A potentially transformative relational approach.
In the second part of the book, Finlay explicates
six specific phenomenological methods, which she
identifies as:







descriptive empirical phenomenology;
hermeneutic phenomenology;
lifeworld approaches;
interpretive phenomenological analysis (IPA);
first-person approaches;
reflexive-relational approaches.

Finlay first describes each of these methods
broadly and then highlights specific research studies
and potential strengths and weaknesses. The last
part of the book considers ―phenomenological
methods in practice‖ and delineates some general
principles for doing phenomenological research,
including chapters on gathering and interpreting
experiential descriptions.
Finlay‘s book is exceptionally valuable in the
way it provides a comprehensive and understandable introduction to phenomenology broadly and to
specific phenomenological principles, notions, and
research methods. An excellent introduction for
phenomenological beginners. See sidebar, right.

From Phenomenology for Therapists
The aim of phenomenology is to describe the lived
world of everyday experience. Lived experience can be
general, such as what being a therapist is like, or else
specific, such as being pregnant, dying of cancer, or
having a sense of ‗losing one‘s footing‘ after a trauma.
Phenomenological research into individual experiences
gives insight into, and understanding of, the human condition. Sometimes it languages things we already know
tacitly but have not articulated in depth. At other times
quite surprising insights reveal themselves….
Phenomenological research is potentially transformative for both researcher and participant. It offers
individuals the opportunity to be witnessed in their experience and allows them to ‗give voice‘ to what they
are going through. It also opens new possibilities for
both researcher and researched to make sense of the experience in focus (p. 10).
Phenomenology… discloses, transforms and inspires.
That is why it excites me, why I am passionate about it.
It is not just a research method. It offers a way of both
being in and of seeing the world from inside and out. It
is not just an intellectual project; it is a life practice. It is
concerned with the discovery and celebration of our
own immersion in body-world experience. The phenomenological project calls the researcher to be reflectively open to connecting with the phenomenon in all its
complexity. When I do phenomenological research, I
immerse myself in wonder and awe of the other‘s experience. I want to be caught up inside that experience.
Through it, I become enchanted and fascinated with the
ambiguity, multiple layers and mysterious paradoxical
depths of human existence.
The strength of this method lies in its ability to
bring to life the richness of existence through description of what may appear at first sight to be ordinary,
mundane living. The magic comes when we focus so
deeply on aspects of individuals‘ ordinary lives we see
that what is revealed is, inevitably, something special;
something more. What is revealed is actually quite
extra-ordinary (p. 26).
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My Dad’s Story:
The House He Lived in for Sixty-Five Years
Jane Barry
Barry is an interior designer whose professional work focuses on ―aging in place.‖ She earned a master‘s degree in Interior Design from Washington State University in 2008. This essay is a revised version of a chapter
from her graduate thesis, which focuses on home modifications for older people. In an email, she explains how
her late father played a central role in her finding a professional focus: ―My father put me on this path, and I
think about him almost every day. I remember how hard his last months were, and I think I didn‘t do enough for
him… I wasn‘t kind enough. But, he was so difficult to deal with! He didn‘t want anything different in his environment. He just wanted things, including himself, to be the way they always were.‖ jbarryd@q.com. Text and
illustrations © 2012 Jane Barry.

A

s I stayed with my father in the last few
months before his death, I observed his
declining ability to function, his intense
attachment to his home (photograph,
right), and his refusal to consider changes to make
life easier. His deepening difficulties made me
aware of the power of habit in human lives—its
rootedness in the body and the lived experience of
moving in and through the home. In my thesis in
interior design, I decided to explore how these ideas
might help in envisioning home modifications for
aging in place [1].
Drawing on my dad‘s experience as well as the
aging literature and interviews with other elders, I
developed two design guidelines to direct a theoretical remodeling of my dad‘s home: First, to preserve
the familiar; and, second, to design for the senses.
Both guidelines require a focus on the experiential
qualities of moving into and throughout a home.
One pays heed to level changes, the direction of circulation, and shifts in spatial volumes—for example, moving from a small, low-ceilinged entry into a
cathedral-ceilinged living room.
In my dad‘s case, I considered his habit of
fetching supplies from the basement, a regular behavior involving the familiar experience of descending and ascending, in all its physical, personal, and
cultural meanings. I decided that he would inevitably make these trips down and up the basement

stairs. What I could do was to make this action safer. I planned a hand rail along each side, and a highcontrast edging on each step—common practice but
now deeply meaningful. So it is that my father‘s
struggles guide my professional life today.
My dad‘s life was deeply rooted in his home.
For that reason, I want to honor him and focus on
that attachment. The meaning of place played a
strong role in his behaviors and the choices he
made, and in his resistance to making changes in his
environment. For example, even after I had placed
canned goods upstairs in a kitchen cupboard where I
thought they would be more convenient for him, he
persistently made trips down to the basement even
as he faced declining strength, energy, and balance.
His behavior regularly baffled me.
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For part of a year, I lived
with my father and helped him
as his health failed. He had occupied his home for 65 years.
Understandably, his wish was to
die at home. Over time, I observed his fervent desire to remain in that house and his difficulty in almost every task. But
he refused to make changes. It
seemed that he couldn‘t (or
wouldn‘t) imagine what helpful
changes might be possible. I
labeled my father‘s behavior
―stubborn.‖ But before I lay out
my deepening understanding of
his situation, let me set the stage
and tell the history that shaped
his house at 516 G Street, Davis, California.
times. Ownership meant that he was now head of
the family.
The house was a two-bedroom ―cottage.‖ The
plans came from a 1938 pamphlet, ―New Small
Homes,‖ published by the L. F. Garlinghouse Company of Topeka, Kansas. The house is described in
the rather flowery language of the time as ―a lovely
little cottage somewhat on the Cape Cod order‖
(plan, above). There was a basement as well as an
attic—features unusual for Davis, even in 1939. The
cost of the 1000-square-foot dwelling was
$3,732.00, according to all the original paperwork
he saved in a file. To finance the house, my dad borrowed from his mother‘s brother, Uncle Neely. He
made the final payback payment in 1958.
In 1941, my father entered the army and, during World War II, his divorced father and mother
lived in the home. His father stayed in the attic. I
would guess that my grandmother allowed it because he had nowhere else to go. He died in the
home in 1950. My father recalls hearing him upstairs coughing.
When my mother and father were married in
1951, they moved ten miles east to Sacramento, and
my grandmother stayed in the house alone. She became ill in 1958, and my dad had a laundry and another bedroom and bath added to the rear of the

History of a House
My dad was a third-generation California boy. His
grandparents came West in the mid-nineteenth century and settled in the Napa Valley. My father grew
up in and around St. Helena, California, where his
father was a ranch hand but apparently not very
good at keeping a job. My dad didn‘t talk about his
dad very much. I suspect his dad was a rowdy
Irishman, with all its unseemly connotations.
As a young man, my dad moved to Davis, 75
miles to the east. He worked in a Purity grocery
store and for the Southern Pacific Railroad as a
crossing guard. In the tower at night, he studied for
the civil-service examination and soon secured a job
at the Davis post office. He started as a mail carrier,
spent time as a clerk, and eventually became Davis‘
postmaster. He retired in 1975 at age 59.
When my dad moved to Davis in 1937, he lived
in a boarding house on the corner of Fourth and F
Streets. Two blocks away and two years later at the
age of 22, he contracted to have a house built for
himself and his mother, who was now divorced. I
believe that this new house embodied all the hopes
and dreams of his life up to that point. The house
was security in the face of uncertain economic
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house so we could move in to care for her (see plan,
p. 10). I spent my school years from first grade
through high school at 516 G Street.
Including the addition, the house was about
1,850 square feet in size. My parents and I had the
two front bedrooms and my grandmother had the
new space in the back. She passed on in 1960, when
I was eight, so we didn‘t all live together very long.
After her death, I moved into her bedroom, and the
front bedroom became an office.

Describing the House
The house at 516 G Street was essentially a backwards ―L‖ shape, with sleeping and bathroom areas
at each end of the structure and living and eating
areas at the center. The kitchen was galley style—
long and thin, widening into a dining area at the
north end. The kitchen functioned as a foodpreparation and eating area. It also served as a corridor from the front of the house to the back. In the
winter, my parents closed front and back doors and
heated the kitchen with its stove—a Wedgewood
model with four gas burners and a wood-burning
compartment, installed when the house was built
(photograph, above right).
The house had no central-heating system. Instead, there was a gas floor heater between the living room and front hall serving the original parts of
the house. The back addition was warmed by a wall
heater between the laundry room and rear bedroom.
My dad never had the heating system upgraded, and
the complicated process of lighting pilot lights was
one of his seasonal routines. He kept a record of the
dates when he turned the pilot lights on and off.
There were three entries to the house: a west
front door into the living room; a north side door
into the kitchen; and an east back door from the
backyard into the laundry, each with a screen door
and two steps up. In the back yard, my dad built a
concrete-paver patio that, over the years, became
lumpy and uneven. About five years before he died,
my dad put grab handles on the outside frames of
the side and back doors to help my mother climb the
steps, but he did not erect any entry railings. The
screen doors made entry somewhat complicated as
my parents aged because they had to hold the screen
doors open while unlocking the entry door.

The house had hardwood floors in the living
room, bedrooms, and hallway. The kitchen floor
was linoleum. A stairway off the kitchen led down
to the basement, and along the top of the basement
wall my father stored canned goods, potatoes, and
onions. There was an open crawl space between the
ground and the sub-flooring where one could see
soft, powdery dirt in all directions. Originally, the
basement stair had no railing, but after my dad had
a stroke in 1999, he had a handrail installed. Underneath the stair was a workshop where he kept tools,
hardware, paint and household cleaners, fishing and
camping equipment, and things he might need, like
jars. These he used as containers for nuts and bolts
that he neatly sorted according to size and purpose.
He never disposed of a jar, bottle, can, bag, or box!
The attic stair was in the front hall off the living
room, between the two bedrooms. This stair had a
single railing. In the attic were trunks of old clothes,
boxes of old letters, papers and documents, a few
pieces of old furniture, and lots of dust. Neither the
basement nor the attic was finished: The basement
walls were plain concrete, and the attic had no insulation—just bare studs and rafters. In fact, none of
the house‘s walls were insulated.
The front bedrooms each had two sets of double-hung windows that provided lots of light and
fresh air. During summer nights, we opened these
windows to let in the cooling ―delta breeze.‖ During
the day, we shut them early, pulled the shades, and
relied on the outside awnings to protect the inside
from the hot summer sun. The house stayed re-
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markably cool unless there was a run of 100-plusdegree days and no nighttime breeze.
A short hall led from the kitchen to the back
addition, past a storage closet and bedroom to the
left, bathroom to the right, and into the laundry.
Here was the washer, dryer, and washtub. The
washer‘s rinse cycle emptied into the tub: a hose
was hooked over the side. More than once, my
mother left a sock in the tub, the drain clogged, and
water overflowed into the room.
Light filled this room because of its north and
west windows. We blocked the summer heat with an
outside bamboo shade. The laundry was a large
room and storage space for various devices and furnishings: a second refrigerator, a bookcase, a builtin linen closet, and a dining room table where my
mother folded clothes and set up her sewing machine for mending. When we had guests, we could
put leaves in the table and extend it to seat eight or
ten. In this way, the laundry room was transformed
into a dining room for holidays. My dad mounted a
beam with curtains that, when pulled, hid the washer, dryer, and refrigerator.

news in the living room, my mother fixed dinner,
and we ate in the dinette. My dad often went into
the home office after dinner to take care of bills and
other paper work. My mom read on the couch in the
living room, and I did homework in my room or at
the dinette table.
My dad‘s spaces were the office, the basement,
and the detached garage on the north side of the
house. My mother rarely ventured into these spaces.
There was frequently something that needed fixing:
window screens replaced, awnings put up or taken
down, pilot lights turned off or on, and so forth. My
dad did these things himself, using tools and supplies he kept in the basement or garage.
He also made sure cupboards and drawers were
stocked. He kept the kitchen supplied with staples.
In the basement, he stored bulk sugar, flour, and rice
in large jars. From this stock as needed, he would
refill smaller jars in the kitchen cupboards. This
way of separating bulk storage and the daily supplies necessitated my father‘s making many trips up
and down stairs or from the front of the house to the
back. At the rear of the laundry room, he made piles
of things to save or tend to later, like newspapers
and magazines. For my dad, there was never a direct route from package to use or from storage to
garbage. Rather, there was always an in-between,
―holding‖ stage, which used multiple spaces and
made for a certain amount of clutter. This was not a
difficulty for him when he was younger, but as he
got older and had to struggle just to get up from a
chair, it was exhausting.

My Dad’s Routines
My dad was in his prime during my high school
years. His typical day went like this. The family
would awake around 6:45 a.m., and my parents
would go into the kitchen. My mother would light
the oven and open the oven door to heat the room.
My dad started a fire in the stove firebox to burn
junk mail, milk cartons, and other discards. He
would use the front bathroom getting ready for
work while my mother made breakfast we ate at the
dinette table. We then went on our ways to work
and school. My dad walked to work, only about
three blocks away. My mother and I rode our
bikes—she to her job at the University library and I
to the high school.
Dad came home for lunch, which I prepared for
him when I was home during the summers. After
work my mother fed the five cats, balancing five
plates in her arms from the kitchen out to the back
door, sometimes with cats underfoot. Shortly after,
my parents would have their five o‘clock cocktail
hour. If the weather was nice, they would sit outside
in the back yard. Then they watched the television

Physical and Functional Changes
When I left home for college in 1970, my parents
had retired and were active and involved with travel
and the community. They spent more than 30 years
of their lives in retirement. Travel was their passion,
but when at home in Davis, they joined in meals,
classes, and social gatherings at the Senior Center
and did volunteer work in the community and the
church. My mother swam several times a week
throughout her life, and both mom and dad walked
with friends regularly.
Gradually, my dad absorbed my bedroom into
his territory as he stashed clothes and other things
throughout the house. The house seemed to become
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more and more his and less and less my mother‘s. I
believe she never felt that the place was hers. She
had wanted a dishwasher and an air conditioner, but
my dad always said no. She was tired of the oldfashioned amenities and ready to move to a retirement village when she reached age 85. My parents
considered various facilities, but my dad would not
budge from his home. My mother died two and a
half years before he did. She was 95 and eight years
his senior.
Not too much changed about the way my dad
used the house after her death. He left my mom‘s
clothes in her dresser and in the closet and her many
family pictures and swimming ribbons on the walls.
He began to use her bed, next to his in their bedroom, for piling clothes and sitting while dressing.
He had several chronic health conditions. His
vision was always poor, and he could barely see out
of his left eye due to a long-standing optic nerve
anomaly. He‘d had a stroke in 1999 when he was
82. He recovered most of his function but was left
with a shuffling gait and some weakness and numbness in his left arm and hand. These problems
worsened over the last seven years of his life as he
became more fatigued and stiff. He took medications for high blood pressure and a heart arrhythmia.
He was finally diagnosed with Parkinson‘s disease, and all these impairments contributed to a
slowness of movement and an increasing inability
to grasp objects. He had difficulty holding objects
with his left hand and dropped things constantly. He
had trouble opening containers, using tools and
utensils, or manipulating buttons and zippers. The
ability to grasp is critical, and I believe this disability caused him more grief than his declining
strength and loss of balance and flexibility.

the pliers tightly enough to turn the stem. The toilet
paper dispenser was to the toilet‘s left, which was
his weaker side, so he kept a paper roll on the sink
in front of him. This was an easy reach for his right
hand but took up space on the small vanity.
As it became more difficult, he would shave
only every few days. Getting dressed in jeans and
shirt took him two hours. Physically, it was difficult
to pull a t-shirt over his head or pull up pants with
one hand. Mentally, these changes in his physical
capabilities confused and depressed him. He didn‘t
strategize but, rather, blamed the object or the situation: ―These damn buttons….why are they so
small?!‖ ―These damn jars….why do they put the
lids on so tight?!‖

Having Breakfast
In the kitchen, his habits and room configuration
required that he make multiple trips across the room
between refrigerator and dinette table and between
sink and stove. Multi-tasking and efficiency were
never his style. He did one thing at a time.
My dad always had tea and usually, hot cereal,
for breakfast. He kept several varieties of loose tea
in the cupboard to the right of the sink. He stored
the tea in labeled, easy-to-handle tins and kept the
original packages in the basement. To boil water, he
used a Revere Ware tea kettle, lightweight, fillable
through the spout, and thus requiring no lid. He kept
the teapot in the cupboard to the left of the sink. He
―scalded‖ the pot before he put in the tea.
To move between sink and stove required turning around and crossing a four-foot space. For
workspace, he used the counter top, or ―sink board,‖
as he called it. He also used the stove surface, since
iron lids covered the wood burner and the unused
gas burners. The oven top served as storage for
utensils, honey, and salt and pepper.
In making tea, he placed the teapot near the
sink, walked across to get the kettle off the stove,
then returned to the sink to scald the teapot with
boiling water. Then he emptied the scalded pot into
the sink, measured tea into the pot, poured in more
boiling water, and placed the teapot in the open oven (across from him, at waist level) to steep. He did
all these interconnected actions with one hand.

Bathroom and Kitchen Difficulties
In the front bathroom, the hot and cold sink spigots
were twisting knobs that required a grasp. There
was little space around the sink to set things. The
light over the mirrored medicine cabinet had an
on/off pull chain requiring a reach above shoulder
level. Rather than a shower, my dad took sponge
baths because the tub‘s shower valve had been broken for years. He tried to fix it but couldn‘t grasp
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flashlights strategically placed throughout the
house—front, center, and rear. I provided him with
a large-button phone, and he kept a portable phone
by his bed at night, although the cradle remained in
the front office because there was no bedroom
phone jack. He called a handyman from the senior
center to change light bulbs. As time went on, he
asked a family friend, Nyla, to do banking and grocery shopping for him. Eventually, when she discovered that items she‘d purchased were spoiling in
the refrigerator, Nyla arranged for deliveries from
Meals on Wheels.

Next, he would prepare his oatmeal, grits, or
cream of wheat. Moving back and forth across the
room, he would bring water from sink to stove, and
take containers and utensils from cupboard and
drawer. When the cereal was ready, he put it in a
bowl, which he placed on the table. He then put teapot, two cups, and strainer on the table and moved
to the refrigerator to get orange juice, which he
poured into a glass and took to the table.
It was a considerable distance from refrigerator
to table—about 12 feet. The refrigerator door swung
to the right, out into the room, and the work area
was across the room. To open the door with his right
hand required removing items with his unreliable
left hand. He then had to pivot left to place items on
the counter about four feet behind him. After carrying the orange juice to the table, he would make another trip to the refrigerator to get milk and carry
the quart carton to the table. He chose to sit facing
west, a vantage point to the street. This placement
required that he go round to the table‘s far side. After he ate, he left dishes and milk out and moved to
the living room, where he sat in his favorite chair
with a heating pad on his shoulders.
This breakfast-time routine was complicated
and exhausting for my dad. He would hold onto
kitchen chairs as he moved around the table. He
would keep a hand on the counter as he traversed
the length of kitchen. Suffering numbness as well as
weakness, he would lose his grip and frequently
drop utensils, pots, and pans during his last months
of life. He knocked things over. He cleaned up after
himself less and less because it was too tiring and
too much more than he could do.
Mental inflexibility added to my dad‘s physical
problems. He was unable to change his habits or to
adapt his taken-for-granted actions to his deepening
disability. He wanted the house to stay as it always
was, even when that made it almost impossible for
him. He became angry when I moved some canned
goods from the basement to a lazy Susan in the
kitchen cupboard. Rather than use the stores there,
he would continue to go downstairs, precariously
clutching the basement stair railing.
In a few instances, he did make things easier
for himself. He kept pliers, magnifying glasses, and

Self and Place
My dad‘s identity was so bound up in his home that
I‘m not sure he differentiated between self and
place in the weeks before his death. He did have
some dementia and was consumed with visions of
disasters at 516 G Street. Several times he asked me
to call 911 to report an imagined fire or theat. Another time he demanded to leave the house and
move to a hotel. The day before he died, he had a
moment of clarity and apologized for all his worry
and outbursts.
Participating in my dad‘s home situation in the
last few months of his life has been a revelatory experience. I have been moved and inspired by his
attachment to home, by his ―stubbornness,‖ by his
struggles and suffering, and by his unwillingness to
accept his declining heath. I did the best I could to
help him. And I continue to remember him as I help
others find practical ways to remain in their own
homes [2].

Notes
1. Jane Barry, 2008, ―Everyday Habits and Routines: Design
Strategies to Individualize Home Modifications for Older
People,‖ master‘s thesis, Department of Interior Design,
Washington State University, Spokane, Washington. Go to:
http://spokane.wsu.edu/academics/design/documents/JaneBarr
y.pdf (accessed February 5, 2012).
2. See next page.
Images: The author in front of 516 G Street, Davis, California,
2007; Description and plan of the house from ―New Small
Homes‖ (Topeka, KS: L. F. Garlinghouse Company 1938);
The Wedgewood kitchen range, installed when the house was
built in 1939.
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Re-Envisioning a House

I

n her thesis, Barry (2008) envisioned a redesign
of her father‘s house that might have better accommodated his physical and mental decline.

Below are her revamped floor plan for the house
and computer renderings of proposed changes for
the kitchen and house exterior.
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W

ithin any research project, serendipity
places a role. New lines of inquiry
often emerge from post-fieldwork
dialogue among team members. As
we were completing work on a study of UK children‘s and family‘s experiences of Community
Children‘s Nursing Services (CCNS) (Carter & Coad 2009; Department of Health 2011), our attention
was drawn from service delivery to a more intense
focus on the impact of the technology and equipment that many children with complex needs rely
on in their homes.
For those parents we interviewed, we were
usually invited into their living rooms. Parents frequently referred to the technological aids (e.g., postural chairs and ventilators) and medical supplies
(e.g., syringes and suction tubes) that they and their
children relied on, revealing how ever-present this
equipment was within the home.
To reduce the impact of the functional technology, manufacturers have designed some of the
equipment to be more homelike and childfriendly—for example, postural chairs that look like
a ―wooden bumblebee.‖ Similarly, manufacturers
have attempted to design roboticized assistive devices to appear more discreet (to avoid attention), in

an attempt to make them look less discrete (distinct
from everything else) and more sympathetic to a
normative aesthetic of home and family life.
In other homes, ventilators and pumps whirred
and labored, medications and distinctive smelling
feeds were administered, and boxes of syringes and
medication were stacked under the cot in which a
child lay. The child‘s dependence on technology
was visually, audibly, and often olfactorily apparent. There was no hiding it from us as guests, and
we do not suggest it should be hidden. Still, some
parents did speak of trying to hide equipment—in
cupboards, behind the sofa, or upstairs out of view.
For the parents we spoke to, these objects
framed the difference between their child and other
children. One mother spoke of how the pediatric
cradle her son lay in, next to the generic ―Moses
basket‖ of his twin sister, became the focus of visitors. They ceased to see him as a child and instead
saw only the cradle that framed the difference between the two children. The mother‘s draping the
cradle with a blanket to hide the stark difference
between the cradles was an effort to remove the
frame that the physical equipment presented—to
pass the child as normal to visitors and to provide a
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The home spaces of families with technologydependent children are different from other family
homes in that they are re-constructed around the
child‘s condition and needs. The home space becomes an appropriated landscape: No longer a family landscape but a landscape of care, ―like a mini
hospital.‖ Home as it was is essentially changed,
and the stories that parents told showed how this
shift had resounding effects.
Getting their child home from hospital represented the most important part of a socio-spatial reconstruction process that more often than not had
begun a long time before the child‘s homecoming.
Parents spoke of how the home felt empty without
the child. Prior to the his or her homecoming, the
dwelling was restructured in preparation for the
child: a string of professional strangers wandering
across and scrutinizing what is essentially sacred
space. Home is anticipated in light of the passing
through of nurses, therapists, installers, health and
safety assessors, and representatives from social
services.
When the child returns, the home is complete
but with the addition of new things in new places,
and old things re-ordered or pushed out. Waves of
new objects move in different directions, displacing
older objects, routines, and a sense of belonging.
Since children with complex health-care needs
regularly move in and out of hospital, there are liminal modes of existence between hospital and home.
The identities of these two places meld as the family tries to comprehend what has become hospital
and what has become home.
Home is part of a parent‘s identity as ―parent.‖
Any disorder in the home leads to the realization
that home is no longer the same place. For some
parents, this shift invokes the feeling that the home
is ―not my home‖ anymore. In one sense, this admission is felt to be heretical, since getting home
does not automatically mean that the parents feel at
home. The event that necessitates a child‘s reliance
on AT may be seen as presenting a biographical disruption to the parents of that child, and this disruption extends into the lived spaces and lived identities of the child‘s parents and siblings (Bury 1982).
Children, their family, and friends become experts in the use and administration of medical tech-

―protective capsule‖ (Carnavale 2007, 10) controlling who sees and does not see the difference.
The mother frankly admitted that the equipment intruded into her home. She challenged us to
―imagine it in your lounge—it‘s ugly‖ (we did imagine it and she was right: it was ugly in the sense it
didn‘t fit). More importantly, she resignedly emphasized that such devices ―...make the child disabled.‖
We agree with Carnevale (ibid.) that assistive
technologies (AT) may be seen as stigmatic symbols. We contend, however, that they may also be
seen as that which does not belong—as something
that is out of place in the home. At the same time,
the child‘s life depends upon the existence of this
thing itself, as life-giving and, therefore, appropriating. This was the tension we witnessed in the children‘s homes.

T

he question of being at home in the world as
dwelling involves an ambivalent dialectic
(Lindahl et al., 2003, 2005, 2006). For the
child and adult, the taken-for-grantedness of one‘s
relationship to AT sometimes renders it invisible
and a bodily extension or part. At other times, AT
becomes an object of direct attention as when it
malfunctions or when visitors see it and the child‘s
limitations become obvious in contrast to those who
are more able. In its appearing, it re-appropriates the
spaces of dwelling and at least partly alienates the
child.
This sense of alienation can also be felt by the
child‘s caretakers. Though the continuation of their
life does not directly depend upon AT in the way the
child‘s does, ontologically, their continued existential security does, since their relationship with the
child characterizes their being-at-home in the world.
Thus, in their shifting visibility, ATs represent continual changes in one‘s attunement to the world, or
to ―homelikeness‖ as Svenaeus (2001) aptly calls it.
If, as Jager (1985, 219) suggests, total inhabitation relies on full embodiment, then, arguably, this
can never be provided by AT. Consequently, those
who rely upon AT can never fully inhabit their
world. The re-appropriation of alien things that really do not belong re-presents itself in ―the suffering
of a ‗no‘ of things‖ (ibid.).
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nologies. The physical (the building and contents),
social (family, friends and health professionals), and
symbolic landscapes (the objects and rituals) of the
home then start to reflect those of the place that all
families wish to avoid—the hospital. In avoiding
the hospital, the family‘s goal is a ―normal family
life‖ in which the child feels included, cared for,
and safe. Though medical technology enables this
possibility, it remains incongruous and symbolic of
the place they aim to avoid. For some parents, the
lack of autonomy and control over the appropriation
of the home space created resentment.

dangers, they were aware that home is a place of
comings and goings rather than stayings and that if
home is to be homelike, it can never be one-hundred
percent risk free.

S

eamon‘s concept of ―at-homeness‖ provides
one interpretive framework for exploring how
parents reflect on the lived experience of
home. Seamon (1979) identified five prerequisites
for a sense of at-homeness, or the feeling of being
completely comfortable and secure in one‘s home:
rootedness (a sense of familiarity and belonging);
regeneration (the restorative function of place); ateaseness (the freedom to be oneself); warmth (a
friendly and supportive atmosphere); and appropriation (a sense of possession and control).
The presence of AT is a challenge particularly
to appropriation and also affects at-easeness. The
presence of AT is a reminder that the family does
not have a choice and is not fully control of their
home space. In addition, AT reminds parents of the
fragility of their child‘s life. This is a source of unremitting anxiety, which one father described as living ―a couple of rungs up the stress ladder.‖ Arguably, this anxiety corrodes the anchor points of ontological security, which Giddens (1990, 92) describes
as ―the confidence that most human beings have in
the continuity of their self-identity and in the constancy of the surrounding social and material environments of action.‖ Without AT, children would be
required to live in hospital, or they would die.
While the parents of the children in the CCN
study were grateful for AT, they also saw it as burdensome in the way it transformed their lived experience of home as they had to restructure their lived
space to accommodate the technology. Regardless
of whether such technology is designed well, it
might be that the individuals and families who rely
on AT will experience persistent ambivalence toward it, being both simultaneously grateful and resentful. This oscillating relationship will always
mean that at-homeness for these families remains a
precariously balanced existential state, characterized not by questions related to one‘s belonging but
by questions related to fitting into the world, where
AT must ―fit‖ into time and place (lived time and
lived space), into human relationships (lived rela-

T

he dialectical relationships with AT are presented in a series of studies by Lindahl and
colleagues (2003, 2005, 2006), who suggest
that home as a lived space is not an unreflective or
taken-for-granted place for those families who rely
on home AT. Lindahl‘s research with adults who
rely on ventilators indicates that home is seen as a
place of comfort, security, and well-being but also
as a place of uncertainty and fragility. Relief characterizes relationships with AT when they are perceived as life-saving. At the same time, however,
they are seen as an ―enemy,‖ provoking fear and
feelings of a burdened life.
While the home may feel safe, the need for AT
for travel and encounters beyond the home can be
both worrying and burdensome for parents. In one
story we heard from parents, their child with a
breathing tube went on a class trip to the zoo. He
was accompanied by a care-giver trained to deal
with emergencies. The child‘s wheelchair was
equipped with oxygen, suction equipment, and
emergency supplies.
All was going well until the group arrived at
the meerkat enclosure where the children became
more animated and excited. In his enthusiasm, the
child pulled at his breathing tube and hurled it toward the nearest meerkat. The situation suddenly
shifted to an emergency as the care-giver had to replace the tube. The medical equipment and the
child‘s dependence on technology were instantly
exposed, made visible and public. Though the new
tube was quickly inserted, this event underlined the
parents‘ anxieties about the potential for harm outside of the relative security of home. Despite these
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tionality), and into the child‘s body, facilitated by
the skills of others (lived body).

Carter, B. & Coad, J., 2009. Community Children‘s
Nursing in England: An Appreciative Review of
CCNs in England.

W

e offer no solution here. More than likely,
designers cannot make discreet that
which is discrete and unsympathetic to a
homelike setting, though more attentive aesthetic
designs could possibly enable a more sympathetic
fit with domestic environments. What our findings
do bring to light are the difficulties that families
face in their own homes. We should perhaps be
more appreciative of just how far the challenges of
chronic illness and profound disablement penetrate
into the lives of families, affecting their very beingin-the-world on every level—physically, psychologically, emotionally, socially, spiritually, and, of
course, environmentally.
There will always be a tension between medical
technology, health needs, and the aesthetic of the
―family home,‖ at least for the parents and caregivers of those who are technology-dependent. Professionals should recognize that compromise is required in that keeping a child at home means that
that home is subsequently changed. Some families
will be able to deal with the situation by reorganizing space or hiding away and storing technology in
cupboards and boxes. In other situations, families
without such possibilities will deal with the situation however best they can.

ww.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@
dh/@en/@ps/documents/digitalasset/dh_124901.pdf.

Department of Health, 2011. NHS at Home: Community Children's Nursing Services (no. 15106).
London: Department of Health.
www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/
@dh/@en/@ps/documents/digitalasset/dh_124900.pdf

Giddens, A., 1990. The Consequences of Modernity.
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Jager, B., 1985. Body, House and City: The Intertwinings of Embodiment, Inhabitation and Civilization. In D. Seamon & R. Mugerauer, eds., Dwelling, Place and Environment. NY: Columbia
Univ. Press.
Lindahl, B., Sandman, P. & Rasmussen, B. H., 2003.
Meanings of Living at Home on a Ventilator.
Nursing Inquiry, 10 (1), 19–27.
Lindahl, B., Sandman, P. & Rasmussen, B. H., 2006.
On Being Dependent on Home Mechanical Ventilation. Qualitative Health Research, 16 (7),
881–901.
Lindahl, B., Sandman, P. and Rasmussén, B. H.,
2005. On Becoming Dependent on Home Mechanical Ventilation. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 49 (1), 33–42.
Moore, A. J., 2010. Space, Place and Home: Lived
Experiences in Hospice Day Care. Unpublished
doctoral dissertation, University of Central Lancashire, Preston. http://clok.uclan.ac.uk/2476/.
Seamon, D., 1979. A Geography of the Lifeworld:
Movement, Rest and Encounter. London: Croom
Helm.
Svenaeus, F., 2001. The Phenomenology of Health
and Illness. In K. Toombs, ed., The Handbook
of Phenomenology and Medicine. Dordrecht:
Kluwer.

References
Bury, M., 1982. Chronic Illness as Biographical Disruption. Sociology of Health and Illness, 4 (2),
167–82.
Carnevale, F. A., 2007. Revisiting Goffman‘s Stigma:
the Social Experience of Families with Children
Requiring Mechanical Ventilation at Home.
Journal of Child Health Care, 11 (1), 7–18.

14
DOI:

14

Environmental & Architectural Phenomenology, Vol. 23 [2012], No.

The Place of Home
Janet Donohoe
Donohoe is a professor of philosophy at the University of West Georgia in Carrollton, Georgia. Her current
research engages a phenomenological and hermeneutic approach to issues of place of memory. This essay was
originally published in Environmental Philosophy, vol. 8, no. 1 (2011), pp. 25–40. The EAP editor would like to
thank EP editor-in-chief Ted Toadvine and the journal‘s editorial board for allowing Donohoe‘s essay to be
reprinted here. jdonohoe@westga.edu. © 2011, 2012 Janet Donohoe.

A

few years ago, a colleague and I were
sitting on a park bench on the grounds of
the Prague Castle. This colleague is
Scandinavian and, as we talked about the
beauty of Prague, she explained that she measures
all landscape beauty according to her own
hometown and its surroundings. She finds those
landscapes most beautiful that are like her childhood landscape. Her remark struck me as an insightful commentary on the normative power of
place [1].
In thinking more about this issue, I was drawn
to consider the relationship of body to home and,
specifically, to Gaston Bachelard‘s descriptions of
the places of the childhood home (Bachelard 1969).
Bachelard‘s account can be more explicitly theorized through Martin Heidegger‘s analysis of dwelling and Edmund Husserl‘s distinctions between
homeworld and alienworld.
In what follows, I consider the interconnections
between place and body, followed by an exploration
of Bachelard‘s imaginative descriptions. Next, I
move into a more theoretical analysis of the function of dwelling and home in the works of Ed Casey
and Martin Heidegger. Finally, I provide a functional analysis of these themes through the Husserlian
notions of homeworld and alienworld.

Body and Place
Yi-Fu Tuan claims that, although divisions and
measurements of space differ from culture to culture, two things are constant as fundamental principles of spatial organization and experience: ―the
posture and structure of the human body, and the

relations (whether close or distant) between human beings‖ (Tuan 1977, 34). In part, this means that body and
place are inseparable. The fact that we are embodied
creatures means that we take up space. But more than
that, we inhabit a place through and in our lived bodies.
On a basic level, we can see the relationship between the body and place in the idea of the home. When
we inhabit a house, we say we live there. We say ―come
back to my place.‖ It is a space that is intimate and into
which we usually only allow those whom we consider
family or friends. The house is where we develop a certain style of acting in the world. In the way it is decorated and arranged, it reflects our character.
But the house, too, arranges us much as any building arranges us but in a much more fundamental, determinate way. Any time we enter a building, we come
under its sway. Our movements must be attuned to the
building as we find our way down hallways, as we locate bathrooms, and so forth. The building opens a particular world to us.
We are motivated in various ways by the building
as well—motivated to look out the windows or not, depending upon whether they are accessible to us. Motivated to linger or not, depending upon whether the
chairs invite or discourage lounging. We are often
forced, perhaps not merely motivated, to walk the long
way through the store past all kinds of goods that might
catch our eye, rather than having a straight shot to the
checkout aisle with our more meager purchase.
We most often are not cognizant of these motivations, but bodily respond to them without really thinking. These ways in which we bodily respond to the built
environment do not disappear once we step outside. We
are in the world in the same way as we find ourselves in
the built environment, not only in the way that the built
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environment includes the sidewalks and streets,
light poles, and electrical wires but also in the ways
we are motivated by the soft grass in the park or the
need to avoid the fire ant hill. These things we often
do with complete neglect of our embodiedness. We
move through the world very much buffeted by its
pre-givenness.
There must be one cautionary word here. We do
not want to think of the body exclusively as something that is passively acted upon by the environment. Because the body is a lived body, it is situating as well as situated. For phenomenologists such
as Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty, the body
is in the world, but not as water is in a glass [2]. The
world and the places we inhabit do not contain our
bodies. Body and world are intertwined, making
place integral to body and vice versa. The body is
what allows us to move in the world and to respond
to the pull of things that interest us.
As Merleau-Ponty (1962, 340) suggests, ―It is
one and the same thing for us to perceive our body
and to perceive our situation in a certain physical
and human setting, for our body is nothing but that
very situation in so far as it is realized and actualized.‖ Thus, it is through the body that we inhabit
our dwelling places, since it is the body that develops the habits and memories that allow it to take up
the place of dwelling. The body is how we get our
bearings and orient ourselves in a place.
But my own body is also only given to me
through the place it inhabits. As Eva Simms (2008,
42) explains, ―the body as mine is given to me not
in itself and through the recognition of the boundedness of its skin but as an element in the equation
of action space... The body becomes predictable in
encounters with the things and people of its action
space, and particular gestures and experiences repeat and sediment in the flesh.‖ The body is how we
make a place our own, and the central place of our
embodiedness is our home.

The Priority of Home
Gaston Bachelard‘s The Poetics of Space is unique
in its poetical treatment of the childhood home. Beginning with the dwelling‘s cellars and darker, secretive places, Bachelard explores their impact on
the childhood psyche. For Bachelard the home rep-

resents the ―protected intimacy‖ of the houses of our
dreams as well as those of our reality. He describes it
simply as ―inhabited space‖—as ―the non-I that protects
the I‖ (Bachelard 1969, 5).
Bachelard also recognizes that the home is intimately connected to memory. In fact, he understands
the home as retaining our past and opening up an immemorial domain. He links this retention of the past
with daydreaming, which he insists makes possible the
memories of prior dwellings. As he remarks,
the places in which we have experienced daydreaming reconstitute
themselves in a new daydream, and it is because our memories of
former dwelling-places are relived as daydreams that these dwelling-places of the past remain in us for all time (ibid., 6).

Further, Bachelard credits the house with the
preservation of human identity. Because it is the first
world that a child encounters, the hostility of the ―external‖ world is something that is experienced secondarily. He acknowledges, however, that the house is
more than a simple repository for memories. It is ―physically inscribed in us. It is a group of organic habits‖
(ibid., 14). He explains that the originary house of our
childhood is one that would not trip us up on a visit after decades of absence. We would automatically, physically respond to it as we once did, skipping the creaky
step, raising our hand just the right height for the light
switch, moving about it with the same gestures we once
did:
In short, the house we were born in has engraved within us the
hierarchy of the various functions of inhabiting that particular
house, and all the other houses are but variations on a fundamental
theme (ibid., 15).

Edward Casey (1993) describes the childhood
home in similar ways. For Casey, however, what is important is the role of the home as hearth, as situation for
living and as a foundation for identity. Who we are has
to do with where we are from. We have a tendency to
identify ourselves according to the places in which we
dwell. Casey adopts this term from Martin Heidegger,
who describes home in terms of our ability to dwell.
Dwelling is a basic character of being and entails a wish
to belong to the environment and to be at home.
Further drawing upon Heidegger‘s notion of dwelling, Casey argues that a building becomes a home from
practices of cultivation. In his essay ―Building Dwelling
Thinking,‖ Heidegger (2008, 349) suggests that:
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to be a human being means to be on the earth as a mortal. It
means to dwell…It also means at the same time to cherish and
protect, to preserve and care for, specifically to till the soil, to
cultivate the vine (Heidegger 2008, 349).

But surely, we think, Heidegger isn‘t romanticizing to such a degree that he thinks in order to
dwell we need to go back to an era when each of us
cultivated the land? Although romanticizing,
Heidegger is not doing so to quite such an extent.
Rather, he speaks of cultivating in terms of the caring that is related to culture.
Heidegger is underscoring the inseparability of
dwelling and building, but he understands building
as constructing and cultivating, the making of edifices and architecture as well as the cultivation of
culture. Both of these activities, constructing and
cultivating, are carried out in terms of dwelling. For
building is dwelling and ―remains for man‘s everyday experience that which is from the outset ‗habitual‘—we inhabit it‖ (ibid., 349). For Heidegger, the
quality of human life depends upon how we are able
to dwell.
And this takes Heidegger back to the idea of
home. According to Vincent Vycinas, home for
Heidegger is ―an overwhelming, inexchangeable
something to which we were subordinate and from
which our way of life was oriented and directed,
even if we had left our home many years before‖
[3]. Home is fundamental to our identity and communal belonging. Home is the point of departure for
all experiences in the world.
Moreover, this home is primordial. Geographer
Eric Dardel suggests that:
Before any choice, there is this place which we have not chosen, where the very foundation of our earthly existence and
human condition establishes itself. We can change places,
move, but this is still to look for a place, for this we need as a
base to set down Being and to realize our possibilities—a here
from which the world discloses itself, a there to which we can
go [4].

The power of this primordial place seems not to
be in dispute, but exactly how does the home function in this primordiality? Before we consider that
question, I want to draw attention to a difficulty
with these accounts of home that we need to keep in
mind. Bachelard has been criticized, by feminists in

particular, who suggest that the childhood home cannot
always be viewed as such a positive place. It is frequently, and probably more so for women, a place of
abuse and fear [5]. Like any other experience of home,
this abuse and fear writes itself on the body and establishes a style of constitution that cannot easily be overcome.
I agree with much of the feminist critique, but I do
not think that critique inhibits the claims that I am making here about the normative power of home. If home is
a place of abuse and fear, then other places too will be
approached initially from that perspective of lack of
safety until one can be persuaded that the place is otherwise. While Bachelard‘s and Casey‘s descriptions
may be limited in that they represent a romanticization
of the childhood home, they are nevertheless tapping
into the normative role that home plays for each of us.
To claim, as I am doing here, that home has a normative power means that encounters with other places,
other homes, places of work, public places, and so
forth, are measured according to the place of home.
This does not necessitate that home be a positive place,
a place of daydreaming as Bachelard would have it, or a
place we wish to return to once we have left it [6].
What it does mean is that our bodily encounters in other
places are stylized according to the home‘s normative
stylizing of our bodies. Abuse at home writes itself on
the body in such a way that places where such abuse is
not present, particularly places that we might call home,
may feel uncannily safe but also anxiously on the brink
of being unsafe.
Our default expectation in such cases would be of
places as being unsafe if our bodies have been habituated to pain and abuse. We may move carefully, unwilling
to disrupt another in that place for fear of home-like
reprisals. We may shrink from touch, even where touch
is caring and loving, due to an expectation of bodily
harm. Any place that disrupts that expectation would be
experienced as not normal, as bodily awkward [7].

The Structure of the Homeworld
What these theorists are getting at in describing a familiar here against which we oppose a there is what Edmund Husserl describes as a distinction between homeworld and alienworld. Our homeworld is a unity of
sense that is manifest in a pre-givenness of the things of
the world that constitute the norm by which we judge
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other worlds and by which the pre-givenness of other worlds becomes given (Steinbock 1995, 154) [8].
In other words, the homeworld structures experience itself. It is pre-given in the sense that we are
not engaged in a conscious constitution of the
homeworld or what is most familiar. We engage
with it in its familiarity in a kind of absent way. We
are not always attentive to it, particularly not as
homeworld or as normative. It is the world of our
habitualities. But more than that, it is the world that
has written itself upon our bodies in such a way that
our very movement through this world is structured
according to it. The ways in which we move and the
givenness of the things of the world are all grounded in our homeworld.
As Anthony Steinbock (ibid., 164) notes, ―we
actually carry with us the structure of our terrain in
the structure of our lived-bodies, in our typical
comportment and in our practices.‖ In using ―terrain,‖ Steinbock stresses the actual physical element, not just the cultural practices of a place. The
physicality of the world of home has a great deal to
do with the cultural practices, the narratives, and the
rituals that contribute to our constitution of the
world [9].
To say that we live in a physical environment
that shapes us is too simple, though. All people of
the same homeworld do not constitute the world in
the same way. It is not that the homeworld functions
as a rigid structure for constitution. Rather, the
homeworld serves as a ground in conjunction with
our approach to the environment. The environment
of a poet is different from that of the profiteer,
which is different from that of the naturalist, even if
they are all experiencing the same place. What they
see and how they see it is quite diverse. Where one
person may see beauty and is perhaps focused on
color and light, another sees potential and is perhaps
focused on structure and accessibility.
What is implicit in Husserl‘s notion of homeworld is that this varied constitution of the same
environment has to do in part with the normative
power of the homeworld. We become attentive to
certain elements of any place due to the habitualities
of our homeworld. Again, Steinbock suggests that
the familiarity of home:

has more to do with the way things in the terrain typically behave,
which in turn efficaciously sketches out a range of future comportment, prefiguring this rather than that, highlighting one practice, dimming down another (ibid., 165).

The things within the surrounding world are thereby colored by the environment. They are ―saturated
with normative significance‖ depending on the practices that compose the environment. That normative significance also makes itself felt at the level of the lived
body. The environment calls forth a style of comportment toward it. This comportment is not one‘s comportment toward this particular place but simply one‘s
comportment. It is one‘s way of being, living, and engaging in the place that is home, but also in the place
that is alien.
Homeworld is always co-relative with alienworld,
and these concepts bring with them the notions of normal and abnormal [10]. While bodily habits, traditions,
and rituals are being established through the constitution of the homeworld, that which is not these habits,
that which stands over against these traditions, is also
being established. In eating with fork and spoon, we do
not eat with fingers or bread or chopsticks.
At the same time, experiences of alienworlds make
the homeworld more explicit to us in its familiarity.
Homeworld in its normality can be so close to us as to
be unrecognizable until drawn into relief by an alienworld experience. Consider the mundane experience of
crossing the street. Until one has gone to a country
where people drive on the opposite side of the road, one
may not even realize the way in which one‘s bodily activity is habituated to look first left and then right before crossing the street. Once one is confronted with
traffic moving on opposite sides of the street, one realizes that this quite normal bodily habit is in fact dangerous in the alienworld. One can try to change that
habit, but it is awkward, at least at first, and may become easier or even habit, but the behavior is still alien.
Even after years of having changed the pattern, there
can be occasions when one ―forgets‖ and reverts to the
old ways. There are, of course, degrees of these kinds
of differences that make themselves apparent at a bodily level between homeworld and alienworld.
We can also understand how this influences the
constitution of the world. In my habit of looking first
one direction, then the other before crossing the street, I
am also used to constituting a streetscape in a particular
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way that, at least for me, doesn‘t include carts, rickshaws, horses, or throngs of bicycles. It is quite possible, then, that when these types of vehicles are on
the scene, I do not even see them. They are not given to me in my constitution of the streetscape until I
am pulled up short by them, or have to jump out of
the way.
We cannot say definitively when these habits
are thoroughly sedimented, but we do know that it
happens very early in life. As Yi-Fu Tuan (1977)
explains, there is tacit knowledge of alienworld
which is necessary for knowledge of homeworld.
Thus the two are co-constituted. We can also see
how this co-constitution transpires developmentally.
In considering pre-givenness and givenness in terms
of developmental issues, we recognize that the
depth or intensity of the influence of homeworld
can vary from individual to individual.
Not all individuals develop at the same rate or
with the same specificity. Yet we can see from empirical research that infants gain a sense of space
and orientation in the first few months of life. As
that sense develops and the infant changes from being primarily prone (at least in Western cultures) to
an upright, mobile being, the foundational experiences get overlaid with the additional evidence of
distance and height, expanse and boundaries (Tuan
1977, 20–33).
At a very young age, roughly two to two and a
half, children are able to distinguish between
―home‖ and ―outside‖ as areas of play, but they do
not get more specific than that and certain poles that
are more familiar seem to hold more significance
for the child—for example, ―here‖ as opposed to
―there‖ (ibid., 25).
Other kinds of situatedness do not develop until
later. As Tuan indicates, children of four or five are
not necessarily aware of how to get from one familiar place to another, since they have not yet acquired the habit of making mental note of the locations of things or landmarks. Child development
specialist Arnold Gesell tells us that a child understands ―where‖ at the age of two or two and a half,
but that the sense of place becomes more specific as
a child gets older [11].
Given these variations in development, it is
possible to recognize that the role of place and

home will vary in intensity depending upon the static
nature of one‘s home. The argument remains, nonetheless, that whatever is static and can become habitual for
the child serves as a homeworld ground of experience.
The constitution of homeworld and alienworld is
constantly transpiring while being reconstituted and critiqued. It is a dynamic process of transference of
homeworld from generation to generation. It does not
behoove us to think of the homeworld as a static norm.
It is a way of constituting that is constantly open to the
newness of each constitutive act, but each constitutive
act stems from the homeworld/alienworld relationship.
We are constantly in the act of generating the homeworld through the repetition and re-constitution of the
tradition we take up within the homeworld.
And when we encounter some place other than
homeworld, its alien qualities manifest in the environment, and pulling me up short in my habits, reveal the
very normative power of the homeworld, which is the
place where my body is most habituated [12]. It is not
that the homeworld is thereby found to be ethically superior. Rather, it is that any other place is more or less
alien by relation to and in constitution with the homeworld. I am not at home when I am bodily uneasy,
when my habits do not fit or do not yield the results I
expect.
This does not mean that the alienworld is lesser or
worse but that it is not home. In fact, I may be all the
more attracted to the alienworld precisely because it is
not home. It may seem exciting and mysterious, or even
more welcoming if my own home is a place of violence
or neglect. But this doesn‘t change the role of home as
home. The homeworld provides a normative power in
that it is familiar and the hallmark by which we measure any other place and where our experiences are typical and are in conformity with our bodily expectations.

Homeworld and Normative Power
Husserl speaks of normativity in terms of the ―normal‖
relation between the lived body and the environing
world. On this account, normality is not, as it might be
for the sciences, exactly the same for all experiencing
subjects. Remember the poet, profiteer, and naturalist
and their differing constitutions of the same place. The
poet sees the beauty and mystery of the forest. The
profiteer sees the business opportunity of lumber. The
naturalist sees a habitat to be preserved. Since Husserl
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views the lived body as a constituting element in
experience, it must play a vital role in what is perceived as normal or alien and abnormal.
This means that the blind person‘s normal is
different from the seeing person‘s normal and the 5‘
1‘‘ person‘s normal is different from the 6‘ 2‘‘ person‘s normal. Normality is a matter of constitution
that includes the lived body of each experiencing
subject. How, given this highly individualistic sense
of normality, could anything be viewed as abnormal? Abnormality is viewed as a rupture or discontinuity of experience. When I pick up my coffee cup
and prepare to take a sip, I first blow on the hot coffee to cool it. As I tip the cup to my lips, I suddenly
am startled by the meeting of my lips with a cold
liquid. My experience of the coffee cup is disrupted
by an unexpected sensation that alters my entire
constitution of the cup as a cup of coffee. The experience is discontinuous.
On the other hand, the experience can be disrupted or discontinuous due to an abnormality of the
lived body. Again, we are not talking about some
kind of idealized body but one‘s own lived body:
When one has a cold, for instance, and can‘t taste or
smell the coffee, or when one has a limb that is
asleep and can‘t grasp things with it or stand up.
These kinds of discontinuities can be incorporated
into a continuous experience as one‘s constitution of
the environing world changes to accommodate these
experiences.
So, when the cold liquid touches my lips, I
don‘t determine that I was entirely incorrect in picking up the cup as I do every morning. I simply determine that this morning, something is slightly different. I focus my attention on the liquid in the cup
to determine that it is in fact water and not coffee. I
set the cup back down and may reach for it again in
a minute or two for a sip of water. It has become my
―new normal‖ that allows my experience to be continuous. When I have a cold, my ―new normal‖ is
perhaps understanding that I can‘t really smell
things appropriately, or I can‘t hear myself speak as
I would normally do. For a time, these situations
become simply the ways in which I constitute my
experiences and incorporate them into my normal
approach to the world. Usually, my new normal

lasts only for a brief time, and I return to the normality
of homeworld soon enough.
In some cases the ―new normal‖ is not so easily
achieved, as, for instance, in the cases of the phantom
limb and the anosognosia that Merleau-Ponty described
in such detail [13]. For the person suffering from either
of these syndromes, the incorporation of a drastic bodily change such as a loss or paralysis of a limb becomes
exceedingly difficult and something the person rejects,
sometimes indefinitely. These individuals still attempt
to engage in the same projects they would have engaged in before their loss, or complain of the pain of a
limb that they no longer have. But, in most cases, they
relearn their bodily engagement in the world without
the use of that limb. To what degree this becomes accepted by them as ―normal‖ varies considerably.
What these examples underscore is precisely the
way in which the habituated body becomes the foundation for constituting the homeworld and allows us to
question to what degree that which is alien can ever be
incorporated into home. If we claim that the homeworld
is normative, then what transpires for those who are
forced out of their homeworld, or who choose to leave
their homeworld? What is the experience of the alienworld? Can the alienworld ever become a replacement
homeworld? If there is this kind of conception of a
―new‖ normal, then wouldn‘t that mean that any alien
world would be incorporated and eventually would become a new homeworld?
Interestingly, Husserl suggests that, in spite of the
multitude of homeworlds, there is still a foundational
unified world of perceptual experience—the perceptual
world. This is the world of pure perceptual experience
and is what he calls the ―lifeworld a priori.‖ All homeworlds are grounded in the singular lifeworld. This, for
Husserl, is an eidetic structure that functions as that
which is neither experienceable nor relative but grounds
both the relative homeworlds and the experiences
thereof.
It is not as if in going to London, I have been
transported to Mars. Even physical environments that
are more radically different than London is from, say,
the small-town American South still share the lifeworld.
If we try to think of the most divergent environments
we can, perhaps New York City in comparison to Samoa in the South Pacific where the people live in pole
sheds and use sea toilets, we notice that as alien as New
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York City would be to someone from Samoa, or as
Samoa would be to someone from New York City,
elements of a shared life world are still evident.
Constitution of discrete objects against a background and other such basic constitutive elements
remain the same.
But does this mean that eventually every alienworld simply becomes absorbed into the homeworld? Is that what is happening in our globalized
world?

Alienworld to Homeworld?
We might object to the notion of the homeworld as
having normative power by referring to those who
are transported to a new place permanently. Think
of immigrants or ex-patriot communities abroad.
Surely, those people who have lived in a place for
several years have adopted many of the customs and
the local language. They have come to respond to
the weather, the altitude, the physical aspects of the
place much as a native would.
Can we not claim that such a place is a new
homeworld? Has the alienworld not taken the place
of the homeworld and the homeworld become alien? In some ways, perhaps, yes. But not wholesale.
Instead, I would claim (with Steinbock) that due to
the co-relative nature of the homeworld and alienworld, the transformation of alienworld into homeworld can never be complete. The fact that both
worlds are grounded in the lifeworld a priori is what
makes possible the experience of both worlds at all.
If the alienworld were not grounded in the lifeworld
a priori it simply would not be experienceable as
world. The lifeworld makes it possible for me to
experience the alien and perhaps even to ―feel at
home‖ abroad, but the home abroad will only be
measured as ―homelike‖ because of the asymmetry
of the originally co-relative relationship between
homeworld and alienworld.
Let me give a brief example of how this conflict between homeworld and alienworld is manifest
in quite material ways, not just in the narrative, the
traditions, and the myths of a cultural world [14].
Having grown up in Nebraska, my alienworld is my
current home in the state of Georgia. I have lived in
Georgia for over ten years—long enough, one might
think, to get used to Georgian ways. And perhaps in

some respects I have. I now drink sweet tea, understand
the best way to eat grits (although I still don‘t like
them), and recognize a good biscuit when I see one. I
can occasionally be heard to use the phrase ―y‘all,‖ and
to focus my ideas for beach vacations on Florida.
But, it‘s the surrounding world that still feels alien.
In Nebraska I enjoyed digging in the dirt as a child.
Each spring we would make tours of the yard looking to
see which bulbs would come back, getting excited at
the first signs of growth. We did very little in the yard,
actually—just enough to keep the rose bushes blooming, a few tomato plants alive, and the irises and lily-ofthe-valley in shape.
In Georgia, the climate and landscape are very different. The air in Georgia is alive with growth. It
weighs heavily upon one‘s skin. Rather than coaxing
things to grow in the yard, I am constantly hacking
away at bushes, brutally pulling up plants as they sprout
anywhere and everywhere. It is impossible to keep
things from growing. While this may seem like a mundane example, it points to what is so fundamental about
this discussion.
Not only have my approach and my habits had to
change, but the very way in which I conceive of myself
and the surrounding world has had to change in quite
radical ways too. I can no longer view myself as the
encourager and caretaker of nature. I am instead virtually at war with nature. Being interested in a sustainable
garden requires constant vigilance against the natural
tendencies of my garden.
Likewise, the world of nature is no longer constituted as the neutral territory of a Nebraska yard, but is
the overwhelming and even dangerous realm of my
Georgia naturescape. With a yard full of 70-foot pine
trees, we live with the anxiety that a tree will fall in a
storm and smash our house or worse yet, kill us in our
beds as happened to a neighbor. In Nebraska, trees are a
luxury, not a danger. The Georgian world is alienworld
in its very landscape, not just as a cultural background.
Will Georgia ever become my homeworld? I think
not. I will continue to develop ways to cope, but it will
always be in co-constitution with the more primordial
and normalizing experience of my Nebraska homeworld. It still does not come naturally to me to constitute growing things as weeds, to pull them up when I
find them in the yard. There will always be something a

21
ISSN: 1083-9194

21

Environmental & Architectural Phenomenology, Vol. 23 [2012], No.

bit uncanny. The pull of the homeworld will always
be there.
And homeworld is not just about the traditions
that get translated through the myths and the stories.
It is about the embodied relationship to an environing world. We cannot so blithely separate the cultural from the environmental, since the cultural is
frequently what it is precisely because of the environmental. Skiing is very much a part of the cultural
world in Colorado with the equipment, language,
and traditional events that surround it. This is not so
in Georgia for very obvious reasons of environment,
climate, and thus culture. On the other hand, gardening for native Georgians is a mark of one‘s belonging. Not so in the mountain towns of Colorado,
since it is almost impossible to get garden vegetables to grow.
So, I don‘t think there can be a real fear of alienworlds dissolving into homeworld. Globalization
cannot eliminate the diversity of environment, landscape, and embodied life. While some of these elements are perhaps more under threat than others, it
is virtually impossible that the co-constitution of
homeworld and alienworld could ever be replaced
with simple lifeworld.
I want to reiterate that I am not suggesting that
the homeworld is better than the alienworld. In
many cases, where one feels comfortable may in
fact be a place completely opposite from the homeworld, but I would suggest that such is the case in
large part due to the experience of the homeworld.
If the homeworld is a place of danger, anxiety, or
abuse, then one may in fact be more comfortable in
the alienworld, but the alienworld is still judged on
the basis of the homeworld. Generally speaking,
homeworld is formative for the ways in which we
constitute the surrounding world, since it is formative for one‘s bodily habits and style of constitution.

Implications of Homeworld
Having discovered here that the homeworld is so
fundamental to the very embodied nature of human
existence, to our ways of perceiving and knowing,
we naturally wonder what the ramifications of this
are. Why should it matter that the homeworld has
this kind of normative effect for perceiving and
knowing? Who cares?

In concluding, I want to raise a few issues for
which this investigation is important. There are ethical
concerns that could come under scrutiny given this
framework. For instance, how might we deal differently
with those persons who are displaced from their homeworld by war or famine? In attempting to place these
people, we might take into consideration the environment and climate, the environmental landscape where
these people could be most ―at home‖ in the alien
world, all the while knowing that no alienworld will
ever be homeworld for them.
We might also reconsider policies regarding adoption of children from one country to another. Is it right
or proper to remove a child of two or older, for instance, from its homeworld and bring that child to a
place that is utterly alien in landscape and tradition?
Think of the lost boys of Sudan who were taken to
Minnesota, Pittsburgh, New York City and several other
American cities. These places are so utterly unlike their
homeworld in climate and landscape and tradition. Is
such a move justified by the ―good‖ it will do those
boys? Is there no other alternative?
Finally, I do wonder whether it is inherently conservative to preserve notions of homeworld and alienworld in this era of time-space compression where the
world is shrinking. I think the answer that Husserl has
helped us to see is that, regardless of how small the
ground-earth is, the homeworld will always arise in
conjunction with an alienworld and that the preservation of these differences is not to be viewed as negative
or hostile but as necessary for the transference of culture and tradition.
So, while it may seem simple enough to suggest
that our aesthetic taste is in large part dictated by the
landscape in which we grew up and which carries our
cultures and traditions within, it is a much bigger thing
to suggest that the landscape carries more than aesthetic
norms with it. It carries the very normative power of
constitution of the world at all. The very way in which I
move my body and the very elements of the landscape
salient to me have everything to do with the normative
power of my homeworld. Or perhaps, to return to
Heidegger, we can see that the desire for home calls us
to be attentive to how building and thinking belong to
our dwelling.
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Notes
1. The concept of normativity will be explained throughout but, in general, I use the concept with respect to a foundational standard to which other places are compared in terms of
our embodied constitution of world. It is not meant to reflect
an average or an optimum but that which serves as a foundation for one‘s typical constitution of the world, one‘s style of
being in the world.
2. For more on their notions of body, see Husserl 1989,
vol. 2, especially sections 36–44, pp. 152–170; Heidegger
1962, pp. 79–80; and Merleau-Ponty 1962, especially part I,
pp. 90–92.
3. Vycinas 1961, p. 84, as quoted in Relph 1976, p. 39.
4. As quoted in Relph 1976, p. 41.
5. See for example Price 2002.
6. For a more contemporary perpetuation of this kind of
Bachelardian view, see Jacobson 2009. Jacobson describes
the home in terms of daydreaming, security, and relaxation. I
do not claim such to be the case. Familiarity does not necessarily mean comfort or security. The home does write itself on
the body in terms of the body‘s development of habits and a
style of being in the world, however, and on this point Jacobson and I agree.
7. What this also draws into question is the predominant
view of home as a place of refuge, a place ―inside‖ that fends
off the ―outside.‖ By using notions of embodied normativity,
we can recognize that what becomes normal, habituated, embodied being for one is not at all the same for another and it
may not be at all a secure ―inside.‖ The language of ―inside‖
and ―outside‖ leads to misunderstanding as does the language
of security and refuge when speaking of the home place. It is
home through its normative power by being the foundation
that is most primary for our embodied habitual being in the
world. It is a position of familiarity, but this does not equate to
refuge, safety, or other romanticized notions.
8. Husserl (1966) explains that ―pre-given‖ refers to
those things that exercise an affective pull upon us, while that
which is ―given‖ is such that we are attentive to it in a more
active way. We focus on a thing, we pay attention to its meaning given to us. See Husserl 1966.
9. Notice that homeworld can equally apply to those who
are homeless, those who are nomadic, or those who have varying degrees of static home life. It does not only refer to the
semi-permanent structure of a house. Military children, for
instance, who do not stay more than two years in any one
place have a kind of moving homeworld since, for them, we
could say the built environment has a certain precedence because it is more static—the military base remains largely the
same even though the bases may be in various corners of the
world.
10. Husserl does not mean ―normal‖ and ―abnormal‖ to
carry any ethical significance. They carry normative significance simply in terms of one‘s habituated engagement with
the world.

11. Gesell 1950, p. 121, as quoted in Tuan 1977, p. 210.
12. Again, homeworld is not necessarily a place of comfort in
the usual sense of the term. In cases of abuse or neglect, the body
is habituated to the abuse and neglect such that a place of safety, a
place devoid of abuse, feels strange or fragile as opposed to the
―usual‖ feeling of anxiety or fear or pain.
13. See Merleau-Ponty 1962, pp. 84–02.
14. In Crisis of European Sciences (1936), Husserl focuses
precisely on this notion of narrative and language in the transference of homeworld across generations. There are also elements in
that text, however, that allude to the primacy of place. Those elements have generally not been the focus of secondary-source
commentary and are the elements I would like to focus upon.
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